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The cognitive system finds patterns in the data that it receives. Perception involves finding patterns in the external world, from sensory input. Language acquisition involves finding patterns in linguistic input, to determine the structure of the language. High-level cognition involves finding patterns in information, to form categories, and to infer causal relations.
Simplicity and the problem of induction
A fundamental puzzle is what we term the problem of induction: infinitely many patterns are compatible with any finite set of data (see Box 1) . So, for example, an infinity of curves pass through any finite set of points (Box 1a); an infinity of symbol sequences are compatible with any subsequence of symbols (Box 1b); infinitely many grammars are compatible with any finite set of observed sentences (Box 1c); and infinitely many perceptual organizations can fit any specific visual input (Box 1d). What principle allows the cognitive system to solve the problem of induction, and choose appropriately from these infinite sets of possibilities?
Any such principle must meet two criteria: (i) it must solve the problem of induction successfully; (ii) it must explain empirical data in cognition. We argue that the best approach to (i) is to choose patterns that provide the simplest explanation of the data; and that this approach provides a powerful approach to (ii), in line with a long tradition of psychological research.
The physicist and philosopher Mach [1] proposed the following radical idea: that the cognitive system should (criterion i), and does (criterion ii), prefer patterns that provide simple descriptions of the data. Here, a description must allow the data to be reconstructed; and the simplicity of a description is measured by its length.
Mach's proposal traces back to Ockham's razor, that, in explanation, entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity; and to Newton's statement in the Principia that we "admit no more causes of natural things than are both true and sufficient to explain the appearances."
But to make Mach's proposal precise requires a theory of description complexity, which awaited further mathematical developments.
Quantifying simplicity
These mathematical developments came in two steps. First, Shannon's information theory justified log 2 (1/p) as a code length for items with probability p. This is helpful for providing code lengths of highly repetitive data patterns, which can be assigned probabilities, such as low level perceptual properties, phonemes, words and so on [2] . Second, the critical generalization to algorithmic information theory by Kolmogorov, Solomonoff and Chaitin [3] defined the complexity K(x) of any object, x, by the length of the shortest program for x in any standard (universal) computer programming language. Surprisingly, it turns out that the choice of programming language does not matter, up to a constant additive factor; and moreover, algorithmic information theory turns out to agree closely with standard information theory, where the latter theory applies at all. Crucially, the algorithmic definition of simplicity applies to individual objects, whereas Shannon's definition depends on associating probabilitieswith objects.
Intuitively, then, we can see the cognitive system's goal as compressing data: coding it in such a form that it can be recovered by some computable process (the mathematics allow that compression may be 'lossy'---i.e., information may be thrown away by the cognition system, but we do not consider this here.) Choices between patterns are determined by the compression they provide---compression thus provides a measure of the strength of evidence for a pattern. This viewpoint forges potential connections between compression and patternfinding as computational projects. Note that the shortest code for data also provides its least redundant representation; elimination of redundancy has been viewed as central to pattern recognition both in human [4, 5] and machine [6] .
More crucially, formalizing simplicity provides a candidate solution to the problem of induction, described above. The infinity of patterns, compatible with any set of data, are not all equal: the cognitive system should prefer that pattern that gives the shortest code for the data.
Regarding criterion (i) above, there are two beautiful and important mathematical results [7] that justify this choice as a solution to the problem of induction. One result is that, under quite general conditions, the shortest code for the data is also the most probable (according to a Bayesian analysis, using the so-called "universal prior."). A second result is that the shortest code can be used for prediction, with a high probability of 'convergence' on largely correct predictions. A third powerful line of justification for simplicity as an effective method of induction is its widespread use in machine learning [8, 9] and statistics [10] .
Simplicity as a cognitive principle
So simplicity appears to go some way towards meeting criterion (i): justifying why patterns should be chosen according to simplicity. What about criterion (ii)? Does simplicity explain empirical data in cognitive science? Table 1 describes a range of models of cognitive phenomena, from low and high level visual perception, language processing, memory, similarity judgements, and mental processes in explicit scientific inference. The breadth of domains in which simplicity has proved to be a powerful organizing principle in cognitive modelling is encouraging.
But how does the simplicity principle stand up to direct empirical testing? This question is difficult to answer, for two reasons. (1) The representation problem: Although, in the asympotote, and assuming the brain has universal Turing machine power, Kolmogorov complexity is language invariant, for many specific, non-asymptotic empirical predictions from simplicity depend on assumptions about mental representation, which will affect what regularities can be detected. But the mental representation of perceptual and linguistic stimuli is highly contentious in cognitive science. (2) The search problem: The cognitive system may prefer the simplest interpretation that it can find, but be unable to find a simple pattern of interest. Thus, without creating a full-scale cognitive model, involving assumptions about representation and perhaps also search, precise predictions from the simplicity viewpoint cannot be obtained [11] .
There are, however, a number of lines of evidence that appear consonant with the simplicity viewpoint.
• A vast range of phenomena in perceptual organization, including the Gestalt laws of closure, good continuation, common fate, and so on, have been widely interpreted as revealing a preference for simplicity. Box 2 discusses some complex cases. The main theoretical alternative, the Bayesian approach to visual perception [12] is mathematically closely related to the simplicity principle [13] • Items with simple descriptions are typically easier to detect in noise and easier to detect [2, 11] .
•
The simplicity of a code for a stimulus quantifies the amount of structure uncovered in that stimulus. The more structure people can find in a stimulus, the easier they find it to process and remember [14] and the less random it appears [15] .
The speed of learning for Boolean concepts (e.g., A or B or C; A and (B or C) etc) is well predicted by the shortest code length for those concepts [16] .
• Similarity can be viewed as a function of the simplicity of the distortion required to turn one representation into the other. This viewpoint makes empirical predictions which are not captured by existing spatial or feature-based theories of similarity, but which have been confirmed [17] . • Shepard's Universal Law of generalization [18] , which implies that items have a probability of confusion that is a negative exponential function of the distance between them in an internal 'space,' can be derived from the assumption that the psychological similarity between two objects is a function of the complexity of the simplest transformation between them, and minimal additional assumptions [19] .
The physiology of early vision, including receptive field shapes, and phenomena such as lateral inhibition, seems adapted to maximize information compression in vision [20] . On the other hand, both theoretical and empirical arguments suggest that, the brain also uses highly redundant 'sparse' neural codes for perceptual input [21, 22] .
To summarize, since Mach, a range of theorists have proposed the sweeping idea that much of cognition concerns compression [23] , or the elimination of redundancy [24] , and the simplicity principle has been developed into a mathematically rigorous method for finding patterns in data [3] ; served as the foundation for a broad range of cognitive models;
and is consistent with a range of empirical data. We suggest that simplicity is worth pursuing as a potentially important unifying principle across many areas of cognitive science. • Phonological29] and morpholgical analysis [30] segmentation [31, 24] and grammar induction [32, 33] High-level [34] • Gencompress [35] • Similarity as representational distortion [18] • Categorization by compression [36] Table 1 : Many pattern-finding problems have been successfully approached by mathematicians and computer scientists using a simplicity principle. In many of these areas, the simplicity principle has also been used as a starting point for modelling cognition.
Box 1: Finding patterns and the problem of induction
There are always infinitely many patterns compatible with any finite body of data. This raises the critical question of how the cognitive system makes appropriate choices from among this infinite range of options. The general problem is illustrated in 1a, where there are clearly any number of continuous functions that can be made to pass through a set of data points. The same issue arises for discrete data. The alternating black/white squares on the left hand of 1b illustrate a sequence of binary data. But, as the right hand of 1b indicates, the overall pattern of which this data is a part could continue in any way. The 'middle' continuation is more Grammar 1 provides a linguistically reasonable analysis; Grammar 2 can produce any word sequence whatever and is clearly wildly overgeneral; Grammar 3 produces just the sentences in the corpus and nothing more. Human learners favour reasonable analyses; but why?
Finally, 1d illustrates the limitless possible hypotheses for elaborating partial perceptual input---only ii. is seriously entertained, though i. and iii. are also compatible with the data.
These illustrations are quite abstract; but, importantly, the same issue arises even if the input is arbitrarily rich: although some specific patterns will be eliminated but such enrichment, an infinite number of incompatible patterns will always remain. vs.
highly skewed angle (another possible interpretation is a circle, at a moderately skewed angle). Thus, data fit, and, apparently, complexity of pattern appears identical here. How can the simplicity principle distinguish the two elliptical interpretations. The answer is that the projection is much more stable for the perpendicular ellipse; for the highly skewed ellipse the angle of orientation must be specified more precisely, costing additional code length, to obtain an equally good fit with the data. Finally, 2d illustrates that simpler interpretations are taken to have causal significance. The right hand 2D figure is perceived as a projection of a wire cube, the left hand figure is perceived as an irregular 2d figure. Crucially, the joints of the wire cube are perceived as rigid---whereas the joints of the irregular 3D figure appear potentially flexible. The joints of the cube are perceived as rigid, presumably because otherwise this 'simple' arrangement would be merely a remarkable coincidence (analogously, a sequence of 100 heads from a coin would be interpreted as indicating that the coin is biased). Thus causal structure may be inferred on the basis of simplicity.
Qualitative demonstrations of this kind have also been supplemented by formal psychology theories which seek to explain the interpretations of perceptual figures as minimizing code length [a] , [b] .
